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Introduction 
Over a number of years, the independent and democratic trade unions of Belarus have been exposed to 
an increasing pressure of the authorities. The latter have deepened the watershed between the ‘state-
favoured’ unions and the independent and democratic ones. This publication deals with a range of crucial 
issues in the trade union movement of Belarus and addresses the challenges that the independent trade 
unionism currently has. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, a broader political and economic 
setting of Belarus is provided to uncover the context where trade unions have to operate (section 1). 
Second, labour market institutions are analysed as a framework defining a range of economic constraints 
and opportunities for trade unions. The third section describes the organisation and content of trade 
union movement in Belarus. In the fourth section, the legal framework, within which trade unions 
operate, is analysed. It has to be noted it is through the laws and, more importantly, their enforcement 
(or otherwise) trade unions are either provided or deprived of certain opportunities. In this section, the 
ILO affair is briefly discussed. Based on the analysis made in the sections 1–4, the final section (5) 
concludes. 
1. The Political and Economic Setting of Belarus 
The political system of Belarus is characterised by the strengthening of authoritarian policies. Specifically, 
the circumscription of political rights has begun since 1995 onwards. Various grades of coercion in 
different spheres of the public life have been employed to suppress the non-governmental social 
activism. Most seriously, two opposition politicians disappeared; some have been imprisoned although 
political reasons have never been admitted by the authorities. Also, more nuanced forms of oppression 
have been applied to. In particular, these forms are informed by a continuous change of the legislation 
procedures regulating the activities of political parties and public associations. Open spontaneous 
protests (like unsanctioned meetings) are nearly forbidden, and, if occurred, brutally dispersed by militia 
(within which a special regiment has been created in 2006 to secure ‘the public order’ in Minsk1). In 
general, meetings are allowed but a special procedure (including the application to authorities for a 
permit) has to be fulfilled, and, very often the public body often suggests some distant locality, away 
from peoples’ eyes, for a meeting. 
 
Independent trade unions are also considered as a ‘problem’ by the authorities. Two leaders of 
independent trade unions, Messrs A. Yaroshuk (Chairman of the Belarusian Congress of Independent 
Trade Unions, BCDTU) and A. Bukhvostov (Co-Chairman of the Radio Electronics Workers’ Union, 
REP) were penalised by civil arrest for criticising the court decision (on the closure of the Air Traffic 
Controllers union) in an independent media (Mr. A. Yaroshuk2) and an attempt to picket in the public 
against the discrimination of independent trade unions (Mr. A. Bukhvostov3). In 1999, a President’s 
Decree No. 2 ‘On Certain Measures to Regulate Activities of Political Parties, Trade Unions and Other 





Non-Governmental Organisations’ has complicated the registration process and established labyrinthine 
procedures for the announcement of strikes. Independent trade unions are often unable to register their 
primary organisations since employers, following the instruction of authorities, are reluctant to provide 
them with a legal address nowadays set as a precondition for legal registration. The absence of the latter 
implies the inability to conduct collective bargaining and sign collective agreements (and, therefore, to 
protect the rights of workers)4. 
 
When dealing with a broader socio-political environment of Belarus, it is necessary to emphasise that 
the alternative viewpoints are hard to articulate and advance publicly. Surveys conducted by the 
Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (whose activity was forbidden at home so 
it has been forced to move to Lithuania5) show that 62.6 per cent of the population obtain information 
on social and political events mainly from the state-run TV and magazines6. These sources are 
exclusively controlled by the state. Accordingly, they tend to translate and promote a biased point of 
view7. There seems to be a scope for manipulation with the public opinion, including on the independent 
trade unions. 
 
The periodicals are also controlled by the government. The editor-in-chief of a single nation-wide trade 
union newspaper, ‘Belaruski Chas’ (Mr. A. Starikevich) has been fired and a new, much more loyal to the 
new leadership of the FTUB, person has been employed. Another media, aspiring to a status of an 
alternative nation-wide trade union newspaper ‘Salidarnast’ (established by the Belarusian Independent 
Trade Union in Soligorsk) has been deprived of an opportunity to be published and disseminated in 
Belarus and gone online8. 
 
The economic situation in Belarus is also bearing a stamp of authoritarian policies. In general, the 
economy of Belarus is characterised by the dominance of the state in various markets and sectors9. But 
it has to be admitted that one of the major problems, such as the balance-of-payments constraint (that 
resulted in devaluation-inflation spiral prior to 2002) has been somewhat lessened due to the ability to 
collect foreign exchange from exports of refined oil to the EU countries. However, productivity 
dynamics (as the essential background for securing wage increases) has not been impressive, and real 
wages sometimes have been growing above productivity (as a part of the political business cycle, see 
below). More fundamentally, money earned through oil exports along with a cheap gas supplied from 
Russia have not been adequately utilised, i.e. not channelled into a serious modernisation of domestic 
production facilities. The agricultural sector has attracted the majority of state funds, but its 
performance has remained weak (given the level of profitability and incomes as compared to funds 
invested). In order to keep inflation in check, the government has not only prevented devaluation (and 
thus made exports more sensitive to wage costs), but also allowed relatively high loan interest rates and 
encouraged growth of expensive (especially in comparison with the new member states of the EU) 
consumer credit. As a result, money earned by relatively better-paid employees has been in a way 
‘bounded’ in the national monetary system, thereby preventing the excessive demand that might unchain 
the inflationary spiral again. 
 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, an opinion expressed by a trade union activist at: http://www.bkdp.org/articles_special_1_7.htm. 
5 In general, the authorities have established controls over the sociological studies, see information at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_4437000/4437450.stm. 
6Data and report are available at http://research.by/eng/surveys/bb0343a6a9bdb701.html. 
7 This is not submerged by the authorities: http://www.cjes.ru/bulletin/?bulletin_id=1991&country=SNG. 
8 http://www.praca-by.info/site/index.php3?l=rus&v=news&data=2006-02-09. 




As soon as problems of high inflation and devaluation were over, and rates of economic growth has 
increased and the poverty levels went down. The authorities have begun to appeal to the (arguable) 
successes of the ‘Belarusian economic model’10. Despite the ambiguity of the government’s propaganda, 
it has to be nevertheless admitted that a certain level of economic prosperity has been achieved. In 
contrast to the late Soviet Union and particularly the early 1990s, consumer opportunities have greatly 
expanded. Also, some business opportunities have been created anyway and exploited accordingly. As a 
result, there is some legitimacy has been gained from the improved economic situation despite of the 
numerous problems that still exist in a weakly reformed Belarusian economy. 
 
A more realistic assessment of the economic situation could reveal a different picture: there are lots of 
social problems that are not resolved at all. For instance, small towns are often filled with unemployed; 
labour mobility is constrained. Also, there is a big unofficial labour market. Scarce employment 
opportunities at home push people to Russia to seek employment in the construction or service 
sectors, usually abroad. The Ministry of Interior of Belarus has estimated that up to 300,000 people 
work illegally in Russia11.. Finally, wages in Belarus appear not to be very high as compared with the 
neighbouring countries12. Some enterprise, especially the ones located in the regions, pay low or even 
survival wages, and there are no prospects for their increase. The desperateness of the situation could 
become more salient if a more nuanced, comprehensive account of the situation is presented. Here the 
role of local trade unions might be crucial (in cooperation) with the opposition forces to reveal the 
truth behind the façade of the official propaganda. 
2. Labour market institutions and trade unions 
Employment regulation 
The labour market in Belarus remains tightly regulated by the government. There are not only political, 
but also economic reasons for such controls. Adjustment to economic changes had initially been carried 
out by such modes as hidden unemployment, administrative leaves, wage delays, and payments in kind. In 
general, over the medium term the quantitative analysis shows that the dynamics of employment 
appears to be insensitive to the dynamics of GDP13. This suggests that there are the channels of 
adjustment to changing market conditions not captured by the official accounting procedures. Indeed, 
the results of the first Labour Survey carried out in Belarus in 2006 showed that unemployment rate 
might be about 7–8% instead of the official figure of 1.5%14 (that captures officially registered people 
only). This implies that there are numerous opportunities ‘exit’ for employees in case they face troubles 
at the ‘official’ labour market. Accordingly, the existence of informal channels reduces the demand for 
trade union ‘services’, especially the protection of jobs and wages, and claims to the government 
concerning job creation. So far, the government has seemed to be tolerating these informal mechanisms 
of labour market adaptation. It is only in 2006, there have been policy proposals made to somehow 
account for existing informal institutions, starting with understanding the scope of the problem (that is 
why the first nation-wide Labour Survey has been carried out)15.. Nevertheless, no policy propositions 
have been either made or implemented. 
                                                 
10 One of the essential features of the model has been high rates of economic growth and incomes, see 
http://belniva.by/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=376&Itemid=43. 
11 See http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2006/11/17/ic_articles_113_148705/. 
12 A detailed analysis of the labour market problems is available at research.by/pdf/WP2005r02.pdf. The paper has 
been prepared by Haiduk et al. (2005) Labour Market in Belarus: An Overview’, CASE Research and Analysis, No. 
313, CASE Foundation: Warsaw. 
13 Chubrik et al. (2006) Macroeconomic Relationships in the Belarusian Economy: The Results of Econometric 
Modelling, St. Petersburg: Nevsky Prostor. 
14 Some information is available at http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2006/11/17/ic_articles_113_148705/print. 
15 Visit http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2006/11/17/ic_articles_113_148705/. 
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The most notable Belarusian ‘innovation’ at the labour market regulation has been the introduction of a 
so-called ‘contractual form’ of employment. This means the substitution of conventional, indefinite-time 
labour contract for fixed-term ones. Such a measure has been officially presented as a way to improve 
the motivation and discipline among employees and to follow the experience of the Western countries. 
However, no one has noted that fixed-term contracts are considered to be abnormal form of hire by 
the EU’s Maastricht Treaty, and only approximately 20% of the EU’s workforce is employed by using 
fixed-term contracts (according to the European Trade Union Confederation)16. In Belarus, it is 
estimated that more than 80% of the so-called ‘real’ sector workers and 100% of the public sector 
workers are employed on the basis of fixed-term contracts. This measure allows employers to threaten 
their workforce with a job loss. Currently, this regulation is used to dismiss activists of independent 
trade unions and threaten the actual and potential members of independent and democratic trade 
unions (see below)17. 
 
For instance, in the course of 2006, representatives of enterprises’ administrations had overtly 
demanded from workers to leave their primary organisations by threatening them with a loss of social 
preferences or even a job as such. In the latter case, a threat of non-extension of a contract for the next 
term has been applied widely. Consequently, the membership of many of the primary organisations has 
declined. For instance, in 2006, the primary organisation of the BNP at ‘Grodno-Azot’ Open J.S.C now 
has 300 members instead of 850, and the primary organisation of ‘Belshina’ Open J.S.C has lost about 
two-thirds of its members, while about 100 people has left an SPB’s organisation at Bobruisk plant of 
tractor components and aggregates18. 
Wage setting and the political business cycle in Belarus 
Since 1992 onwards, the wage setting has been drifting away from a decentralised system toward 
strengthening of government regulation in this area, although a number of elements of collective 
bargaining have been left intact. Prior to 1998, enterprise-based unions appeared to be strong enough to 
set up wages independently of other enterprises in other branches and economy as a whole. The 
absence of a coherent nation-wide wage setting as well as the support of workers’ collectives had 
allowed decentralisation to flourish until intra- and inter-industry wage differentiation had become 
notable19. The government has become aware of this situation and since 1998 onwards a number of 
regulations have been adopted to restrict the decentralising impact of collective bargaining agreements. 
 
It has to be maintained that collective bargaining in Belarus takes place at numerous levels. However, 
there is no strict hierarchy, but a coexistence of nation-wide, regional, branch, and enterprise levels of 
bargaining. Often, bargaining has formal character. Although almost every enterprise has its collective 
agreement, many of them remind a sort of general plant on production and socio-cultural issues. 
Recently, what increasingly matters in Belarus in wage setting is the government’s intervention resulted 
in the existence of the so-called ‘political business cycle’20 partially substituting the activities of trade 
unions. 
 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/02/feature/eu9802183f.html for earlier information. 
More recent information is available at http://www.etuc.org/a/2356. 
17 Numerous cases are reported at htpp://www.praca-by.info. 
18 Information is collected from the personal interviews with the trade union’s leadership. 
19 See Haiduk et al. (2004) The Belarusian Economy at a Crossroads, Moscow: Aveks/ILO. 
20 See Haiduk et al. (2005) Labour Market in Belarus: An Overview, CASE Research and Analysis, No. 313, CASE 
Foundation: Warsaw, available also at: research.by/pdf/WP2005r02.pdf. 
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One of the most notable outcomes of the state regulation of wage setting has been a continuous gap 
between real wages and productivity. In East-Central European countries, at least prior to 1998, a 
reverse situation has been observed21. In the Belarusian economy, wages-productivity gap indicates the 
importance of the labour market regulation by the state and, at the same time, suggests that there is a 
need for market reforms leading to a productivity upgrade. It is not all industries that display such a gap, 
but many of them record it, and, accordingly, thus informing the economy-wide difference in the 
dynamics of real wages and productivity (see figure 1). It is only recently the gap has been narrowed 
down. Such a gap suggests of the existence of what is called ‘the political business cycle’. 
 
It is based on the increases of real wages above productivity growth rates by manipulating with the 
various components of wages to achieve their raise (see table 1). It appears that the government skilfully 
manipulates with wage setting and thus partially substitutes trade union’s role in this process by using 
political business cycle. Another way to constrain the unions’ actions is to manipulate with the legal 
framework (see section 4 below). 
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Source: own calculations of the basis of the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis data. 
 
Table 1: The Political Business Cycle in Belarus 
USD wage Events 
Growth rate Target level 
Wage debts 
14 May 1995: referendum 160% yoy - May 1995 
188%  yoy – June 1995 
-- -- 
24 November 1996: referendum Real wages decreased after a 
month 
-- September 1996. – 24% of the total 
wage fund; 
October 1996 – 6.5% of the total 
wage fund 
9 September 2001: presidential elections 36% yoy – 1999,
44% yoy – 2000,
58%yoy – January-August 2001 
USD 100 by 
September 2001 
August 2000 – 17% of the total wage 
fund, September 2000 – August 2001 
– 2.4% of the total wage fund (August 
2001 –  0.5%  of the total wage fund). 
After the elections: growth by 15 
times. 
17 October 2004: referendum  28.6, 40.5 и 43.5% yoy –
October, November, and 
December 2004, respectively 
USD 200 by the end 
of 2004;, USD 250 by 
the end of 2005 
Almost no debts since September 
2003 onwards 
Source: Chubrik et al. (2006) Macroeconomic Relationships in the Belarusian Economy: The Results of 
Econometric Modelling, St. Petersburg: Nevsky Prostor, Chapter 3. 
                                                 
21 See Galgóczi, B. (2002) 'Wage Trends in Central and Eastern Europe'. Labour Education, Paying Attention to 
Wages, 2002/3, Number 128, pp. 39–44. 
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3. Trade union organisations and their role 
The Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus and its predecessor 
The collapse of the USSR has produced new challenges for the trade unions. The successor organisation 
in Belarus, the Federation of Trade Unions ‘Belorusskaya’ (FPB) had been facing a declining output, falling 
real wages and high inflation. In 1994–1995, the Federation had supported the protests of spontaneous 
strikes of 1995 against wage delays. According to some estimates, one of the meetings attracted about 
13,000 protesters; 200 of them rushed towards the building of the Presidential administration and asked 
him to visit their enterprise22.. Since 1995, the leadership has displayed some signs of discontent with 
the policies of the President. Mr. Gontcharik negatively evaluated the attempts to strengthen 
government regulation instead of policies of job creation, support of domestic producers in conjunction 
with creation of favourable conditions for foreign investors23. The Federation had taken part in initiation 
of several relatively big strikes in summer 1996 (at ‘BelVAR’ production had been stopped) as a protest 
against wage delays. The Federation also supported the demands of petty entrepreneurs and traders to 
abolish backward introduction of new taxes. But more fundamentally, the Federation supported the 
Supreme Soviet by calling it, despite ‘mistakes and shortcomings’, a ‘sort of reflection of society’ and 
stressing that a singular viewpoint [shall not] be forced upon it24. 
 
However, the capacity to develop a well-structured argumentation against the government policies has 
not been demonstrated widely. Instead, the activism has been shifted to enterprise level. The evidence 
on wage setting can be called upon the support this claim. Until 1998, there had been a strong trend for 
wage decentralisation, as enterprises had expanded their wage autonomy over the industry level, not to 
speak of a national one. The minimum wage had lost its meaning: instead, it had been used for some sort 
of accounting purposes25. In similar fashion, the trade unions have not pushed for revision of the 
consumer baskets, despite the calls of a number of trade union leaders to do so. As a result, the 
government had probably perceived unions as weak in the sense of their capability to protest. 
Nevertheless, the FPB had managed to express criticism of the government’s policies within the 
framework of the National Council on Labour and Social Issues (NCLSI). 
 
Within the Federation of that time, there were forces oriented towards more substantial change. These 
are typically associated with Messrs Bukhvostov, Fedynich and Yaroshuk (the leaders of two branch 
unions). Nevertheless, Mr. Gontcharik himself, although being an apparatchik, had strived for some new 
developments. In particular, the Federation had begun the process of entry into the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), a democratic international forum uniting many trade 
union organisations across the world. However, the Federation has never become the fully-fledged 
member of this international body. On the one hand, in order to reach this goal, an organisation is 
supposed to pass a number of procedures. On the other hand, the events of 2001 had changed the 
government’s attitude towards Mr. Gontcharik and, hence, the Federation as such. 
 
This change in the attitude is related to the promotion of the Federation’s Chairman as an opposition 
candidate for the presidency. Since that time, the government’s stance has become different. An attack 
was launched upon the Federation and some of the leaders of branch trade unions that displayed 
independence and expressed their strong criticism towards the government policies. These were the 
Belarusian Automobile and Agricultural Machinery Workers’ Union (ASM) chaired by Mr. A. 
                                                 
22 Data are taken from the archive of www.praca-by.info and other trade union media; and also Mandel, D. (2004) 
Labour after Communism, Montreal: Black Rose Books. 
23 Profsoyuznoe Obozrenie, No. 9, 1996, p. 7. 
24 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, October 14, 1996, p. 3. 
25 Haiduk et al (2004) The Belarusian Economy at a Crossroads, Moscow: Aveks/ILO, and particularly Chapter 2.6. 
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Bukhvostov, the Belarusian Radio and Electronic Industry Workers’ Union (REP) chaired by Mr. G. 
Fedynich, and the Agricultural Workers’ Union chaired by Mr. A. Yaroshuk. Prior to that, in February 
2000, the Head of the Presidential Administration, Mr. Mikhail Myasnikovich, ordered to create 
conditions for non-re-election of these three stubborn union leaders26. First, some measures had been 
employed at lower levels of branch hierarchy: trade union activists were fired, and some primary 
organisations (at large industrial enterprises, such as ‘Integral’ plant in Minsk, Rechitsa Hardware Plant, 
etc.) left their branch unions. 
 
By that time, the authorities have recognised that at least there is some potential for political deviation 
that could be released. Indeed, the FPB had more than 4 million members (and still have them now). As 
in Western Europe, trade unions sometimes can play a decisive role in elections by providing or 
otherwise the support to certain political forces. Although elections in Belarus have often been 
frequently estimated as fraudulent by international organisations, such as the OSCE27, the authorities still 
rely on the consensual support of the majority of citizens. Even the independent opinion polls shows 
that opposition leaders hold a minority; in percentage points they are by many times behind the 
dominant political establishment28. 
 
After the defeat of Mr. Gontcharik at the elections in 2001, a new Chairman, Mr. F. Vitko had continued 
to display some sort of independent position towards the government. In particular, he started to 
cooperate with the ILO to set up a policy centre under the joint auspices of the Federation and the ILO 
in order to gain an independent expertise of the economic situation from a trade union’s point of view. 
However, Mr. Vitko soon left the Federation for a diplomatic career. 
 
The authorities have recognised that potentially trade unions could be a force expressing discontent 
within the Belarusian society. Accordingly, it was decided to deal with the emerging (albeit really 
decisive) stubbornness of the Federation by economic means, namely by cutting it off the funding it used 
to rely upon. Specifically, the Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution that banned the transfer of 
trade union membership dues through accounting departments of the enterprises. In the USSR and after 
its collapse, dues used to be automatically deducted from monthly wages (at a rate of 1%). After this 
new resolution, the funds available to unions declined considerably across various enterprises and 
branches. A small survey conducted by the Radio ‘Svaboda’29 right after the event showed that workers 
were reluctant to pay their dues by cash. Consequently, the unions have begun to experience a 
reduction of the volume of funds available to them. However, this revealed the attitude of members of 
trade unions towards their organisations. The costs of going to the cashier and paying dues appeared to 
be higher than the membership in the union. 
 
As a result, the leadership of the Federation had been facing a credibility problem. Member unions had 
begun to question the ability of the Chairman to communicate with the government: his (and his 
predecessor’s) stubbornness went perhaps ‘too far’ and there was a need to find a way of out this 
artificially created crisis in the relationships. 
 
Here a new candidate has been proposed to chair the Federation, Mr. Leonid Kozik, the Deputy Head 
of the Presidential Administration (and the former Chairman of Belarus-Iraqi Commission on 
Cooperation). Some consultations have been held with the delegates of the Federation’s Plenum right 
                                                 
26 This is reported at www.praca-by.info. Also, information is available at http://www.ng.ru/cis/2000-07-
08/5_minsk.html. 
27 For instance, information can be found at http://ru.belaruselections.info/archive/2004/monitoring/0039357/. 
28 The most recent opinion poll shows that more than 50% of voters support the President of Belarus, while 
opposition politicians jointly have about 18%; data can be found at: http://www.iiseps.org/poll07.html. 
29 The web address is www.svaboda.org. 
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before it was held. Also, there was information spread that support of Mr. Kozik would mean the 
cancellation of the Council’s transfer ban. Indeed, Mr. Kozik’s accession to office in 2002 soon resulted 
in the restoration of the system of bank transfer of dues. The Federation has also been granted with 
some economic preferences (like the creation of a special ‘innovation’ fund, etc.). The full compliance 
with the government’s policies is also reflected in the return of word ‘Belarus’ in its name: according to 
a President’s order, only those organisations that represent the country ‘truthfully’ deserve to use this 
word. Accordingly, the Federation has been renamed to the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus 
(FTUB). 
 
By April 2004, the opposition inside the FTUB has been exterminated. In particular, the only 
independent union, the REP, has left the Federation. As for other branch unions, they have switched to a 
policy of compromise with the leadership. The latter has expressed its support for the government’s 
policy by suggesting only some cosmetic corrections. 
 
In August 2004, a new legal measure has begun to be prepared, namely a draft law ‘On the Introduction 
of Changes in the Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Trade Unions”. This document had been kept 
secret for broader public and also independent trade unions. Its core aim was to establish new 
membership thresholds that enfeebled independent trade unions could not pass. Specifically, for a 
nation-wide union to be registered, membership is supposed to be no less than 7,000 members. The 
authorities referred to an ‘international experience’, like the Belgian one (a country with the similar 
population size), ignoring the fact that the Belgian legislation provides membership threshold for a union 
willing to sign up a nation-wide wage agreement; otherwise, bottom-lines are not needed at all30. The 
ILO affair has prevented this draft to be translated into the Law, but it is premature to say that the 
government full rejected this idea as such. 
The ILO affair 
Briefly, the ILO affair is about a complaint lodged against the Government of Belarus by some of the 
trade unions (including the REP, the ASM, and the member organisations of the BCDTU.). The ILO 
initiated the Case No. 2090 on violation of the trade union rights by the Government of the Republic of 
Belarus. In March 2001, the ILO Administrative Council sent a number of recommendations on the 
elimination of these violations to the Belarusian authorities. In November 2003, following the Belarusian 
authorities’ systematic violations of trade union rights, the ILO Governing Body decided to appoint a 
Commission of Inquiry in accordance with Paragraph 26 of the ILO Statute. By May 2004, the 
Commission of Inquiry conducted its mission on objective fact investigation directly in the Belarus and 
then at closed hearings of the case in Geneva. The investigation, which lasted for six month, resulted in 
finding evidence of serious violations of rights of workers in Belarus. The Commission’s 
recommendations include immediate registration of trade union organisations involved in the complaint 
and the elimination of all obstacles to the right to organise created by current Decrees, rules and 
regulations; guaranteed protection to carry out their activities freely for those organisations that have 
suffered interference with their internal affairs; and the wide dissemination in Belarus of all its 
conclusions and recommendations without a delay. Several of the Commission’s recommendations 
carried a deadline of June 1, 2005. This deadline has not been respected, and the ILO referred to the EU 
to withdraw Belarus from its Generalized System of Trade Preferences (GSP). The government reacted 
immediately by displaying its willingness to improve the situation, but the EU has nevertheless decided to 
apply the sanctions valid since the mid-2007 if no improvement is observed. 
 
                                                 
30 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/03/articles/be0603019i.html. 
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Indeed, being threatened with the withdrawal of the EU’s trade preferences (provided within the GSP 
framework31), during autumn 2006 the Belarusian authorities have made some feeble attempts to follow 
the suggested way. In particular, the President of Belarus publicly expressed his intention to make a 
process of registration of public organisations, including trade unions, more convenient than before. It 
has been claimed that a new Law ‘On Trade Unions’ planned for adoption by the end of 2007 would 
contain some new clauses. For instance, the demand to have a legal address for a trade union 
organisation to be registered might be cancelled. So far, this requirement has been the major obstacle to 
a legal activity of trade unions. Besides that, the ILO recommendations have been published in a 
government newspaper ‘Respublika’ (‘The Republic’). Further, a representative of the independent trade 
union centre, the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions has been invited to take pat in the 
work of the NCLSI. Last, but not least, the Deputy Chairman of the Air-traffic Controllers’ Union, Mr. 
Oleg Dolbik, has been restored at his working place that he lost in 2004 due to trade union activity in 
January 2007. 
Non-FTUB Trade Union Organisations 
• The BCDTU and its member organisations 
The Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Union (BCDTU) was set up in 1993 as a nation-wide 
trade union centre alternative to the FPB. Originally, it consisted of two unions: the Belarusian 
Independent Trade Union (BNP) and the Belarusian Free Trade Union (SPB). Later, some new 
organisations joined the BCDTU, namely the Belarusian Free Metal Workers’ Union (SPM), the 
Belarusian Democratic Transport Workers’ Union (DPT), and the Trade Union of Teachers (the latter 
two ceased to exist after some time). In 2002, the Belarusian Air Traffic Controllers’ Union became a 
BCDTU member, but in August 2003 this union’s activity has been stopped by the authorities. Currently 
the BCDTU has approximately more than 10,000 members (this figure is provided by the Congress 
itself). In order to strengthen its position internationally and thus to make position at home a bit more 
secure, the Congress has become the member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU). This signifies that the union is recognised by the international community (in contrast to a 
partial recognition of the FTUB by some non-ICFTU organisations)32. 
 
The Congress has an uneasy record of the relationships with the authorities. For instance, in 1994, the 
government refused to sign a Tariff agreement with the union, but a year later it had been able to take 
part in developing and signing of a new agreement. Between 1992 and 1995, membership has increased 
quite considerably (from 500 in 1992 to 10,000 in 1995)33. Being aware of this growing strength, the 
government had attempted to pressurise the union. One of the most notable attempts was reprisals 
against a one-week metro strike of August 17, 1995. This has been a precondition for greater protests 
since Gomel trolleybus drivers and employees of ‘Integral’ plant had also decided to strike. Since 
Congress’ Chairman of that time, Mr. Gennady Byuikov, had been close to the Belarusian National Front 
(a national-democratic political union), corresponding political forces had joined the protests. The 
President and the government reacted harshly by using strike-breakers from Russia and Ukraine and 
then dismissing the protesters; finally, independent unions of metro workers in Minsk and trolleybus 
drivers of Gomel were simply outlawed; political parties were threatened with non-registration in case 
they opt for supporting the strikers. 
 
                                                 
31 The system allows to access the EU market duty-free or with reduced tariffs. Detailed information is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/index_en.htm. 
32 Please go to http://www.bkdp.org/static_about_bcdp_1.htm for more information. 
33 Profsoyuznoe Obozrenie, No. 9, 1996, pp. 7–8. 
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Under the Gontcharik-led Federation, the BCDTU has allowed to sit at the NCLSI (being the 11th 
member of the Council with a right to vote), but this does not imply that the relationships between two 
trade union centres had been smooth. Rather, the Federation had been jealous – as natural to any 
monopoly striving to preserve its influence – of any alternative organisation trying to break with the 
Federation’s monopoly. However, it had been impossible to ignore the growing strength of independent 
trade union organisations emerged in the early 1990s as the result of the efforts of those people who 
were unhappy with the trade unions in the late state socialism. Also, it is likely that the goal of the 
membership in the ICFTU had forced the Federation to accept the BCDTU at the bargaining table. 
 
Organisationally, the BCDTU consists of a number of unions. First, the Belarusian Independent Trade 
Union (BNP) created in the early 1990s by the Soligorsk miners. The BNP was initially planned to 
become a nation-wide union comprising employees of the mining and petrochemical industries (such as 
‘Belaruskalii’ in Soligorsk, ‘Nitrogen’ in Grodno, ‘Polimir’ in Novopolotsk and Mozyr refinery). The BNP 
is financially secure since its major enterprise, ‘Belaruskalii’, exports potash fertilisers. Also, there is an 
element of solidarity provided by working conditions. Miners work underground and develop a sense of 
unity as people facing certain everyday challenge, just like the army people. The union is strong at its 
enterprise where it tries to achieve its best according to the existing legislation. Currently the BNP 
unites 7 primary organisations, amounting to a total membership of more than 8,000 people. Primary 
organisations of ‘Belaruskalii’, ‘Polimir’, and ‘Azot’ are the backbone of the union34. 
 
The Belarusian Free Trade Union (SPB) has emerged out of strike committees of 1992. In the beginning, 
workers of different industries were the members (e.g. from transport, metal-working, education, 
healthcare, and power engineering), but later even petty entrepreneurs began to join the union (but also 
leave it). Organisationally, the commonality of interests has been hard to achieve due to diversity of 
industries of the union’s members belong to. However, the union is famous for the Minsk metro strike 
of August 1995 organised by the SPB. The strike resulted in suspension of the SPB’s activity for more 
than 2 years. In 1999, the SPB took part in the ‘alternative’ presidential elections held by a disappeared 
politician, Mr. Victor Gonchar. The ‘revenge’ from the authorities had followed. In general, the union has 
been also involved in the oppositional politics by supporting social-democratic political forces. As a 
result of this involvement, there were hardships deliberately created to undermine the SPB’s activity. 
Most notably, SPB’s organisational units were refused registration because of the absence of ‘legal 
addresses’. Currently this union has approximately 1,000 members located across various branches, 
including such enterprises as Bobruisk Plant of Tractor Parts and Automated Units, the Polotsk Plant 
‘Steklovolokno’, and the Minsk-based Automated Lines Plant. 
 
The Belarusian Free Metal Workers’ Union (SPM) is an offspring of the SPB, and unites the primary 
organisations of the Minsk Automobile Works, the Mogilev Automobile Plant, the Minsk Engines’ Plant, 
the Minsk Tractor Plant, the Brest ‘Tsvetotron’ plant, and the Minsk Automatic Transfer Lines Plant. In 
the early 2000s, the SPM had been attacked by the authorities to destroy the independent trade union 
organisation at the Tractor Plant. As a result, its primary organisation was closed down. As for the 
Automobile Plant, the organisation stayed unregistered so their members were unable to sign up a 
collective agreement, etc. However, the SPM has remained active and survived the tough inspection by 
the Ministry of Justice in 2004. Now it has about 1,000 members (while before the figure was about 
3,000). Four primary organisation of the SPM (namely ‘Les’ enterprise in Orsha, Optical and Mechanical 
plant in Vileika, Electro-Technical Plant in Minsk, and Motor-building Plant in Zhitkovichi) have signed up 
their own collective agreements. 
                                                 
34 http://www.bkdp.org/static_struktura_1.htm. 
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• The REP union 
Apart from the BCDTU, there is an evolving independent trade union organisation, now entitled the 
REP union. It is currently chaired by Mr. Gennady Fedynich, whose union was forced to leave from the 
FTUB. Initially, the new union welcomed all those activists who left the ASM union protesting against the 
withdrawal of Mr. Alexander Bukhvostov from its chairman’s position. The union has been seen as an 
additional independent trade union centre that comprises workers across different branches of the 
national economy. In April 2004, the Ministry of Justice had registered the new union (initially 
abbreviated the REPAM) officially, but soon decided to change its decision. Specifically, the Ministry of 
Justice simply ‘cancelled’ the registration by a direct order. In fact, this runs against the existing 
legislation that prevents the Minister of Justice to cancel the registration as soon as it is done (although 
the Ministry could refuse registration). The Supreme Court has left the cancellation decision unchanged 
so that the union has been forced to return to its REP format. The union is continuing its struggle in 
very dramatic conditions. However, it has adopted a successful strategy towards defending people at the 
courts against unfair dismissals, wage issues, etc. As a result, membership has increased by 12% over 
2006 to reach 1,500 people. There have been some propositions to unite the efforts of the REP and the 
BCDTU within the framework of a single organisation. However, these propositions are not yet 
materialised. 
4. Legal constraints 
Registration/non-registration 
There are three obstacles in this area: legal address is a prerequisite for registration; denial of 
registration by the officials without providing a clear explanation; a pressure upon members put by 
employers; and, finally, a supportive attitude of the courts towards the decisions made by the officials. 
 
It appears that the authorities have implemented a number of policy tools to hamper the activities of 
independent trade unions. One of such requirements is to have a legal address for trade unions in order 
to be registered officially (and, therefore, to conduct necessary activity, including signing up of a 
collective agreement, etc.). The need to rent an office space is a necessary precondition for a trade 
union to get registered; otherwise, it can not appeal to the court (a legal address is required as a part of 
a package of documents). Sometimes, landlords are afraid to provide their private premises for trade 
unions (being afraid of possible punishment by the executive authorities). Independent unions might hire 
an office space at commercial rates, but these tend to be very high for them. 
 
Also, the authorities often respond to registration applications by establishing that ‘a trade union 
organisation cannot be registered’ instead of ‘registration is refused’. In this case, there is formally no 
ground to make a court appeal against the decision of registration authority. The only way is then to 
appeal against the actions of officials that issue such a response. In their turn, employer is trying to 
pressurise the members of independent trade unions. The threat is orchestrated very simply: by noting 
(either explicitly or implicitly) that a fixed-term contract would not be extended. As a result, some 
people leave the union, and registration documents have to be resubmitted. This case is observed, for 
instance, with the REP primary organisation of workers of the Gomel motor car park No.1. Finally, the 
courts tend to support the decision made by the registration bodies. So far there are no cases of 
registration following a court’s decision35. 
Dismissals 
Currently employers have acquired a special tool to deal with activists of independent trade unions. This 
is a ‘contractual’ form of employment. Clearly, refusal to extent a contract is never claimed to be ‘the 
                                                 
35 As it can be seen from various information notes at http://www.praca-by.info. 
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belonging to either trade union’, but something like ‘an economic necessity’. Among the people 
dismissed until recently are the Chairman of the SPB’s primary organisation at ‘Chemical Fibres’ plant (a 
required coordination with the SPB’s leadership was simply disregarded), the Chairman of the SPB’s 
primary organisation of the Polotsk Secondary School No. 10, the Chairperson of the Regional 
Organisation of the Belarusian Trade Union of Cultural Workers, the Vice-President of the liquidated 
Belarusian Trade Union of Air Traffic Controllers, and so on36. Many of these people are unemployed, 
forced to change their occupation, or rely on occasional jobs to obtain the means of existence. 
 
In general, the core effect of the legal and other administrative barriers to the functioning of 
independent trade unions is constraints on their membership. However, between 1998 and 2002, there 
had been the evidence of the growing trust to independent trade unions. In particular, the degree of 
trust went up from 14.5% (in October 1998) to as much as 34% (in November 2002) and, most 
recently, to 37.7% (November 2006)37. It could be rather realistically expected that as soon as 
constraints are eliminated or, alternatively, independent trade unions would be strengthened 
organisationally and financially, membership could grow quite substantially. 
Conclusion 
As it can be seen from a brief analysis conducted above, the Belarusian independent trade unionism has 
uneasy record of struggles and conflicts with the authorities. Being aware of the possible union strength, 
the authorities are keen to maintain the unions under controls. This attitude has become much clearer 
after the Presidential elections of 2001. On the one hand, there is a sign that the authorities remain 
sensitive to the issues that are typically of trade union’s concern, namely jobs and wages. In fact, the 
government has employed a number of measures to ‘substitute’ in some ways the unions’ efforts. This is 
manifested in the existence of the political business cycle. On the other hand, there are ‘exit’ channels 
for workforce, thus somewhat reducing the demand for unions’ services. 
 
Crucially, the government seeks to discipline workers in a number of ways. At the moment, the most 
important element of such a discipline is the introduction of fixed-term contracts for a vast majority of 
the employees. What has been initially planned as a very limited technique to penalise some 
undisciplined workers is now turned into the instrument of threat. In particular, some trade union 
leaders have been dismissed by using the non-extension of their fixed-term contracts. So there is an 
important issue to support those members of trade unions who suffer from their status. 
 
The FTUB displays its compromise attitude towards the authorities. In particular, it has not managed to 
make any substantial changes into the application of the contract form of employment. In contrast, the 
independent and democratic trade union organisations appear to be much more active in this regard. 
Specifically, the independent trade unions have raised the urgency of the contract employment issue 
several times, but their attempts are blocked by the authorities. The latter has erected a number of legal 
barriers that are uneasy to overcome. The efforts made by the ILO to influence the attitude of the 
government of Belarus towards independent trade unions have so far been limited. Nevertheless, there 
are some very recent signs of awareness such as the postponement of the introduction of a new, less 
independent union-friendly Law on Trade Unions. Still, one of the major problems independent trade 
unions experience is the membership. However, the opinion polls show that there is a sufficient trust to 
independent trade unions so as soon as artificial barriers fall, new members would join these unions. 
 
                                                 
36 Information is available at http://www.praca-by.info. 
37 Data are available at: http://www.iiseps.org/opros44.html. 
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Policy Recommendations toward Assisting Independent and Democratic Trade 
Unions: Enhancing economic and legal security of trade union members 
 
Financial Assistance: Independent trade unionism does not offer safe jobs by definition, and 
particularly in the authoritarian societies. Reports by the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (www.icftu.org) show that unionists are repressed for the political reasons in these countries. 
The situation is less dramatic in Belarus, but the phenomenon of the ‘social execution’ should be taken 
into account rather seriously. This mainly includes loosing jobs or refusal to sign up fixed-term contracts 
with the members of the independent trade unions or their leaders. The situation is particularly tense in 
the regions, where labour markets are much more sluggish than in oblast cities or in Minsk. Accordingly, 
firing means sometimes a prolonged stay with no income. Given this, it could be rational to create a 
special fund to support the (temporarily) unemployed independent unionists. The core aim is to 
compensate for a temporary loss of income. The exact amount of financial assistance has to be 
consulted in each of the cases. But in general, it could be set up at a rate of average monthly wage, paid 
monthly (250–300 USD per month). As for the duration period, it  should be subject to further 
decisions, too, but could be equal to the average period of finding a new job (currently about 6 months). 
Such a measure would be not too expensive, while it would make (job) insecurity less acute. Although 
by official means this may judge illegal, however when no legal opportunities exists to defend the rights 
of independent unions and their members, and no ways to improve situation in the future, such 
meaningful actions are needed.  
 
Legal Assistance: The functioning of the ILO project in Belarus shows that one of the efficient forms 
of assistance highly attractive to trade union activists is the provision of legal assistance, ranging from 
formal consultations to the representation in the courts. The problem with the ILO/international 
organizations-type of help is that it could not be provided on the official basis, e.g. the legal 
expert/lawyer of the ILO or any other international organization could not go to the court. What could 
definitely be efficient to attract new members is to increase the staff (public defence attorneys) dealing 
with legal cases only. These attorneys could be employed as trade union lawyers or to be hired 
externally. The affiliation with the union is necessary since for a lawyer it is important to have some type 
of an ID.  
 
Labour economists/wage specialists: unions can be assisted by local labour economists, who should 
focus exclusively on wage issues.  
 
The problem with the forms of support described above is that they call for some sort of semi-official 
provision of funds. At a first sight, this might sound inconvenient to those who prefer public education 
programs and insist on formal cooperation and technical aid. But the latter is increasingly hard to 
provide officially because of the toughening of the legislation regulating the provision and the use of 
foreign aid by domestic At the same time, the results of these institutionalized and formalized activity is 
not automatically straightforward: they have not altered the situation, but rather created a small 
‘resistance holes’ that could be stopped by the government. For instance, the REP union is fighting for a 
very long time with the legal machinery of the state on the registration issue; the case appears to be 
extremely hard and laborious to work with. The ILO has already accumulated a long experience 
working formally (resulting in the stopping the activity of its regional centres by the authorities following 
the demand of the Ministry of Economy). This experience calls for other forms of assistance. The 
creation of ‘emergency’ or ‘severance’ fund for those who suffer from unemployment, persecution, etc, 
along with a provision of legal assistance by hired lawyers seem to be the more efficient way to upgrade 
the unions’ capacity to deal with issues they have to deal with. 
 
